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Abstract— Air Traffic Control (ATC) and their responsible 
authorities have been always very sensitive to safety of the 
systems they are using to guarantee a fool-proof and 
environmentally safe operation of the facilities to provide 
guidance for the airplanes. This paper deals with the influence of 
a pulsed systems on standard air-ground aviation 
communication systems. A measurement campaign is described. 
An analysis of the inaccuracies of those measurements is 
performed and the influence of (shielded and unshielded) spark 
plug systems on aviation communication systems (still based on 
A(mplitude)M(odulation)) is explained in detail 
Index Terms—pulsed RF, EMC, communication. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Safety of ATC equipment does not only implies that its 
ruggedized construction can withstand severe operating 
conditions, but also that people/engines in the neighbourhood 
cannot either influence the working of the systems or be 
influenced by them. This paper will limit itself to the effects of 
unwanted radiation from pulsed sources like ignition engines 
on communication systems. 
II. EFFECTS ON COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
The main concern of the authorities was the construction of 
a nearby (about 55 m) road, close to the reception centre, 
where the communications of the pilots are received on the 
ground. The receiving elements are vertically polarised and 
mostly linear antennas (with two exceptions for the 
communications towards planes coming from France) mounted 
on four 20 m high towers (Fig. 1). Class A equipments, 
according to the CISPR 22 (Comité International Spécial sur la 
Protection Radio-éléctrique) standard [1], are allowed to 
generate spurious electric fields of 57 dBV/m for the electric 
field at a distance of 3 meter from the noise source or 47 
dBV/m for normal equipments at frequencies above 250 
MHz and 50 resp. 40 dBV/m in the band from 30-250 MHz. 
They correspond with linear field strengths of 708 V/m and 
316 V/m for class A above 250 MHz and 224 V/m below as 
well as 100 V/m for ordinary equipment (|E|=10dB/20 
V/m). 
 
Fig. 1: Reception centre for air to ground communications. 
 
Based on the EPICS program [2], it is very easy to compute 
the fields below the receiving antennas, needed to obtain a 
given voltage value in the receiver (Fig. 2). It was found that 
theoretical computations implied that a safe distance of 495 m 
had to be kept for all class A interferers. It was first verified 
experimentally on 25-2-2000 that most cars (in this case a 
Pontiac Transsport model 1993 with a plastic frame, where all 
electromagnetic waves can travel trough nearly unimpeded) 
were complying with those standards. On 29-2-2000, a 
Chrysler neon was tested in even worse circumstances: a 
spark plug was removed from its cylinder so that the spark 
was visible. Even then the values remained within the CISPR 
22 limits, but coming very close (Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 2: Loss computations for both polarisations above a perfectly conducting 
ground, including approximated free space formulas. 
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Fig. 3: Spectrum of a car, measured in the open area test site of the De Nayer 
Institute at 1 m distance. 
 
However, the actual road, passing by at 275 m, never caused 
any interference problems (the only problems they ever 
experienced was a grass cutter, but close to an auxiliary 
antenna, located on the roof of the building and not on the 
tower, as well as a bad vacuum cleaner, used in the rooms 
where the receivers were located). Measurements performed 
by the CCRM (Centre de Contrôle des Radiocommunications 
des services Mobiles, a non-profit private certification 
company) also indicated that they were able to induce 
interference at a distance of 400 m from the receiver with a 
continuous signal. This has forced us to analyse more in detail 
the behaviour of the receivers in the presence of pulsed 
signals. The analysis of a spark plug signal in a classic 
ignition system with transformer coils used both as an 
inductance and to generate the high voltage is very interesting. 
Indeed, that signal consists in a series of short sparks, every 
time the damped oscillation voltage is exceeding the 
breakdown voltage. We noticed that for every opening of the 
contacts about 7 sparks (random between 5 and 9), one about 
every 180 nsec. were generated, one every time that the 
voltage over the inductor was sufficiently high to initiate a 
voltage breakdown (Fig. 4, P(ulse)R(epetition)F(requency) 
about 182 Hz). The pulses themselves are extremely small 
(about 50 nsec. in duration,), leading to a worst case duty 
cycle of 50/180 or 27%, leading to an absolute worst case 
distance reduction to 138 m. For a 4-takt engine, the maximal 
PRF is 500 Hz, if we assume that the maximal number of 
R(evolutions)P(er)M(inute) is 15000 (1 spark/2 revolutions 
x 4 cylinders= 2 spark pulses per revolution of the 
engine axis). If we use this maximal PRF of 500 Hz (2 
msec.) and the largest number of observed sparks (9), this is 
distance is further reduced to 111 m. 
 
Fig. 4: View of the signal on the primary of the coil. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Detailed view of the signal on the primary of the coil. 
 
Fig. 6: Detailed view of the signal within a spark measured on the output port 
of a wideband antenna. 
We expect them to obey the behaviour as predicted by 
Trichel [3]. This implies that the shape should follow an 
exponential law like: 
/ /i(t) ( / )t tAte A t e      (1) 
where the time constant is of the order of 28 nsec. This should 
look like Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 7: Shape of an ideal Trichel pulse. 
The spectrum can be analytically calculated as: 
+
-j t 2
0
I( )= i(t)e /(1/ )dt A j

      (2) 
The discrepancy with the measurement of Fig. 6 is partly due 
to the fact that the antenna does not couple DC, but gives the 
derivative of the input pulse. Even then, only one oscillation is 
expected. This might be due to the fact that many sparks occur 
nearly simultaneously on the plug (which is a small parallel 
plate). 
To verify our conclusions experimentally, we went around on 
site first with a calibrated pulse generator from Rohde and 
Schwarz and a linearly polarised antenna (Fig. 8). This was 
generating -40 dBm with a duty cycle of 50% and a PRF of 
500 Hz at 126.375 MHz. The receivers were set to open at 
signal of 1 V, corresponding with -107 dBm. During those 
measurements, we also noticed that the fence around the path 
to the receiving centre was depolarising the fields 
significantly. A DGPS system was used to determine the 
distance to the antennas (the differential part is the white ball 
antenna on top of the car; Fig. 9). Then, we used the spark plug 
commanded by a drilling machine (Fig. 10; of course in 
permanent contact with military and civilian ATC and the 
BIPT (Belgian spectral regulatory agency) to stop the 
experiment within 1 second). We were able to generate 
interferences up to a distance of 75 m from the antenna 
towers, while at 120 m no effects were noticed any more. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Calibrated antenna set-up with a pulse generator. 
 
Fig. 9: Set-up of the measurement equipment with the spark plug. 
 
Fig. 10: Detail of the set-up of the measurement equipment with the spark 
plug. 
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Let us now look at the spectrum of the spark (Fig. 11). This 
was measured in an EMC room at a distance of 3 m for the 
worst antenna polarisation (in this case horizontal) and for a 
rotation speed of the drilling machine at 2700 RPM. The 
spectrum is only decreasing slightly (about 10 dB) after 100 
MHz, while the spectrum of an ideal Trichel pulse decays at a 
rate of 40 dB/decade. The spectrum at 400 RPM is, as 
expected about 8,3 dB lower (400/2700). The rapid variations 
are due to the measurement time of the system. In some cases 
not as many sparks are integrated into the measurement. One 
should essentially look at the envelope of the signal. This 
disappears at higher speeds. The spectrum of the drilling 
machine itself (this one was satisfying the EMC requirements) 
is much lower. 
 
 
Fig. 11: Spectrum of the spark plug at 2700 RPM (horizontally polarised 
antenna). 
 
Fig. 12: Spectrum of the spark plug at 400 RPM (horizontally polarised 
antenna). 
 
We were able to prove experimentally that the effect of a 
signal, due to the A(utomatic)G(ain)C(ontrol) of the receiver, 
was, due to an RC filter integration, proportional to the product 
of the field strength and the duty cycle (Fig. 13). So, a signal 
with a duty cycle of 5% must be 20 times larger in amplitude 
or 400 times larger in power than an equivalent 
C(ontinuous)W(ave) signal before it has a significant effect on 
the receiver (a small background noise equal to the 
P(ulse)R(epetition)F(requency) of the pulsed signal may be 
audible, but usually it is less than the cockpit background noise 
in the airplane). 
 
Fig. 13: Reaction of two types of receivers to a signal with a PRF of 500 Hz. 
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Further computations show that it would be possible to shield 
the lower (ground) environment from the receiving antennas, 
while not degrading the signals received from the airplanes by 
adding a fence on the antenna platforms. A 6 dB shielding 
would guarantee a fully safe operation at the planned road 
distance of 55 m. A small 24° inclined screen with meshes of 
10x10 cm and a size of 1.36 m would attenuate 6 dB. A 9 dB 
shielding would even protect the antennas from all 
unintentional interferences on the ground independently of 
their distance to the antenna tower (Fig. 14). This could be 
realised with an inclined mesh of 1.66 m (using the ITU 
formulas [4]). We also measured the effects of a 802.11b 2 
Mb/s frequency hopping based wireless LAN, and a spark 
generator from a central heating system. The first had no 
measurable effect at all, and the second had a much smaller 
effect than the raw car spark system. Since it was not sure that 
the structure  would be able to support this extra shield under 
all (wind) condition, it was decided to obtain the 6 dB by 
increasing the sensitivity to 2 V, also reducing the burden of 
communications with far away (and difficultly audible) 
aircraft. 
 
Fig. 14: Extra attenuation required to shield a spark, taking into account the 
antenna patterns.. 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
The adverse effects of badly are usually very limited in 
space. For communication systems, even if the interference 
zone remains small (75 m), it would be even possible to design 
a shield that would completely block interferences from all 
occasional interferers below the antenna (of course not of 
intentional jamming). 
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